UIdaho Law

Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs

6-19-2008

State v. Ellington Respondent's Brief Dckt. 33843

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/
idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs
Recommended Citation
"State v. Ellington Respondent's Brief Dckt. 33843" (2008). Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs. 335.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs/335

This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Idaho
Supreme Court Records & Briefs by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
vs.
JONATHAN W. ELLINGTON,
Defendant-Appellant.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

NO. 33843

FILED - COpy
·JUN I 9200S

-------------------------)
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

Supreme Court _Court of Appeals_
Entered on ATS by: _
•

APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL
DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE
COUNTY OF KOOTENAI

HONORABLE JOHN L. LUSTER
District Judge

LAWRENCE G. WASDEN
Attorney General
State of Idaho
STEPHEN A. BYWATER
Deputy Attorney General
Chief, Criminal Law Division

ERIK R. LEHTINEN
Deputy State Appellate
Public Defender
3647 Lake Harbor Lane
Boise, Idaho 83703
(208) 334-2712

DANIEL W. BOWER
Deputy Attorney General
Criminal Law Division
P.O. Box 83720
Boise, Idaho 83720-0010
(208) 334-4534
ATTORNEYS FOR
PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT

ATTORNEY FOR
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT

TABLE OF CONTENTS
PAGE
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ............................................................................. iv
STATEMENT OF THE CASE .......................................................................... 1
Nature Of The Case .............................................................................. 1
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings ................... 1
ISSUES ............................................................................................................6
ARGUMENT ....................................................................................................7
I.

Ellington Has Failed To Carry His Burden Of
Establishing Prosecutorial Misconduct ....................................... 7

A.

Introduction ......................................................................7

B.

Standard Of Review .........................................................7

C.

Ellington Has Failed To Establish Prosecutorial
Misconduct Or That Any Possible Misconduct
Interfered With His Right To A Fair Trial .......................... 8

D.

Ellington Has Failed To Show That The State
Used Evidence Of His Post-Miranda Silence
To Establish Guilt Such That He Was Denied
A Fair Trial ....................................................................... 8

E.

Ellington Has Failed To Show That The State
Solicited Evidence That Aroused The
Passions And Prejudices Of The Jury And
Denied Him His Right To A Fair Trial. ............................ 12
1.

The Prosecutor Did Not Elicit Testimony
Or Make Statements To Arouse The
Prejudices Of The Jury When He
Questioned Mr. Hartmann Regarding
The Reasons Why He Worked At RMIN
Only For A Short Period Of Time ........................ 13

F.

II.

III.

2.

The Prosecutor Did Not Engage In
Misconduct By Repeatedly Referencing
The Fact That Ellington Ran Over Mr. Larsen's
Wife ..................................................................... 15

3.

The Prosecutor Did Not Engage In
Misconduct By Offering The Testimony
Of The Pathologist .............................................. 16

Ellington's Claims Of Misconduct Did Not
Preclude Him From Receiving A Fair Trial And,
Therefore, Ellington Was Not Entitled To A New Trial. .. 19

The District Court Properly Exercised Its Discretion
In Admitting Evidence ............................................................... 23

A.

Introduction ....................................................................23

B.

Standard Of Review ...................................................... .24

C.

The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion
By Admitting An Exhibit That Contained The
Word Homicide ..............................................................24

D.

The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion
By Allowing Trooper Daly To Testify That
Ellington's Ramming Of The Honda Was Not
Accidental ...................................................................... 25

E.

The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion
By Allowing Dr. Marco Ross To Testify About
The Type Of Injuries Sustained By Vonette Larson ....... 27

Ellington Has Failed To Demonstrate That His Due
Process Rights Were Violated By The Voir Dire
Process Of Excusing Jurors ..................................................... 28

A.

Introduction ....................................................................28

B.

Standard Of Review ....................................................... 28

C.

Ellington Has Failed To Show That The
District Court Abused Its Discretion In
Determining That Ellington Failed To Show
That He Could Not Select A Fair And
Impartial Jury From The Jury Panel. .............................. 29

ii

IV.

Ellington Has Failed To Establish Any Error Or
An Accumulation Of Errors That Deprived Him
Of A Fair Trial ........................................................................... 30

CONCLUSION ...............................................................................................31
CERTIFICATE OF SERViCE ......................................................................... 31

iii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES

PAGE

Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637 (1974) ................................................. 13
Doyle v. Ohio, 462 U.S. 610 (1976) ...................................................................... 8
Ellen v. Brady, 475 F.3d 5 (1st Cir. 2007) ............................................................. 9
Fletcher v. Weir, 455 U.S. 603 (1982) .................................................................. 8
Greer v. Miller, 483 U.S. 756 (1987) ..................................................................... 9
Ross v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 81 (1988) .............................................................. 29
State v Babb, 125 Idaho 934,877 P.2d 905 (1994) ..................................... 13, 21
State v. Barcella, 135 Idaho 191, 16 P.3d 288 (Ct. App. 2000) .................... 19, 30
State v. Crawford, 110 Idaho 577, 716 P.2d 1349 (Ct. App. 1986) .................... 26
State v. Crea, 119 Idaho 352, 806 P .2d 445 (1991) ........................................... 24
State v. Dragoman, 130 Idaho 537,944 P.2d 134 (Ct. App. 1997) .................... 26
State v. Gray, 129 Idaho 784, 932 P .2d 907 (Ct. App. 1997) ............................. 31
State v. Hawkins, 131 Idaho 396, 958 P.2d 22 (Ct. App. 1998) ......................... 30
State v. Hedger, 11.5 Idaho 598, 769 P.2d 1331 (1989) ...................................... 28
State v. Hopkins, 113 Idaho 679, 747 P.2d 88 (Ct. App.1987) ........................... 26
State v. Howard, 135 Idaho 727,24 P.3d 44 (2001) ........................................... 24
State v. Lopez, 141 Idaho 575, 114 P.3d 133 (Ct. App. 2005) ............................. 8
State v. Luke, 134 Idaho 294, 1 P.3d 795 (2000) ............................................... 28
State v. Martinez, 128 Idaho 104, 910 P.2d 776 (Ct. App. 1995) ....................... 11
State v. Merrifield, 109 Idaho 11, 704 P.2d 343 (Ct. App. 1985) ........................ 28
State v. Missamore, 119 Idaho 27, 803 P.2d 528 (1990) ................................... 30

iv

State v. Parkinson, 128 Idaho 29,909 P.2d 647 (Ct. App. 1996) ....................... 24
State v. Porter, 130 Idaho 772,948 P.2d 127 (1997) ......................................... 13
State v. Ransom, 137 Idaho 560,50 P.3d 1055 (Ct. App. 2002) ........................ 26
State v. Reynolds, 120 Idaho 445,816 P.2d 1002 (Ct. App. 1991) ...................... 8
State v. Romero-Garcia, 139 Idaho 199, 75 P.3d 1209 (Ct. App. 2003) .............. 8
State v. Santana, 135 Idaho 58, 14 P.3d 378 (2000) ......................................... 29
State v. Scroggins, 91 Idaho 847,433 P.2d 117 (1967) ..................................... 29
State v. Smith, 116 Idaho 553, 777 P.2d 1226 (Ct. App.1989) ........................... 20
State v. Tucker, 138 Idaho 296, 62 P.3d 644 (Ct. App. 2003) .............................. 8
State v. Walters, 120 Idaho 46,813 P.2d 857 (1991) ......................................... 26
State v. Zichko, 129 Idaho 259,923 P.2d 966 (1996) .................................. 22, 26
State v. Zimmerman, 121 Idaho 971, 829 P.2d 861 (1992) ................................ 24
United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97 (1976) ........................................................ 20

RULES

I. C.R. 29.1 ........................................................................................................... 19

I. RE. 403 ............................................................................................................22
I.R.E. 702 ............................................................................................................ 26

I.R E. 703 ............................................................................................................ 26

I. RE. 704 ............................................................................................................26

v

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Jonathon W. Ellington appeals from his judgment of conviction for second
degree murder and two counts of aggravated battery.
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings
At 3:30 am, Ellington got in a disagreement with his live-in girlfriend and
drove his Chevy Blazer, which had no license plates, to Ronald Cunningham's
house on Sacrcello Road to drink beer and watch TV.

(Tr., p.1064, L.20 -

p.1066, L.9; p.1162, L.5 - p.1166, L.12; p.1165, L.18 - p.1166, L.23.) Ellington
arrived at his friend's residence at 6:00 am.

(Tr., p.1064, Ls.20-22.)

Upon

leaving the Cunningham residence in his Blazer, Ellington ended up behind a
white Honda. (Tr., p.1193, L.3 - p.1194, L.16.) The occupants of the Honda
were two girls: Javon and Joleen Larsen. (Tr., p.349, Ls.7-10.) Javon was 22
years old and Joleen was 18. (Tr., p.342, Ls.7-21.) Javon was taking Joleen
back to her parents' home. (Tr., p.1193, Ls.3-6.)
Ellington appeared upset that the Honda was driving slow and he was
unable to pass her because of an on-coming vehicle.

After the on-coming

vehicle passed, Ellington sped-up, passed the Honda, and then stopped at the
next intersection.

(Tr., p.1194, L.18 - p.1195, L.17.) Ellington got out of the

Blazer, approached the car, swore at Javon and Joleen, challenged them to a
fight, and punched the Honda's window on the driver's side. (Tr., p.353, L.3 p.354, L.9; p.1195, L.15 - p.1196, L.5.) The girls called 911 (Tr., p.355, Ls.1720) and, not being able to give a license description to the 911 operator, followed
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Ellington. (Tr., p.356, Ls.18-24.) Ellington, aware that the girls were following
him and believing that the girls had or were going to call the police, drove past
his home and turned around. (Tr., p.359, LsA-16; p.1168, L.21 - p.1169, L.2.)
After turning around, Ellington drove his vehicle in the wrong lane directly at the
girls, swerving at the last instant into the other lane. (Tr., p.359, L.15 - p.360,
L.3; p.1200, L.21 - p.1201, L.7.) Ellington was ultimately able to lose the girls
who were still on the phone with the 911 operator. (Tr., p.361, Ls.17-23.) After
losing sight of Ellington, the girls waited for an officer from the sheriff's
department. (Tr., p.362, L.20 - p.363, L.3.) During this time the 911 call ended
and the girls called their parents, Joel and Vonette Larsen. (Tr., p.363, Ls.1319.) A sheriff's deputy arrived, gave them a witness statement form to fill out,
and left to investigate.

(Tr., p.365, Ls.18-25; Tr., p.1104, LsA-9.) The girls'

parents, driving a maroon Subaru, also arrived at the location. (Tr., p.363, L.23 p.365, L.11.) They also left to look for the Blazer. (Tr., p.363, L.23 - p.365,
L.11.)
After losing the girls, Ellington returned to his home where he got in yet
another disagreement with his girlfriend. (Tr., p.1171, L.6 - p.1172, L.19.) After
Ellington's girlfriend left to go to a friend's house (Tr., p.1172, Ls.14-19),
Ellington got back in his Blazer and drove back by the location where Javon and
Joleen where filing out their police paperwork (Tr., p.367, Ls.10-16). Ellington
flipped them off as he passed them. (Tr., p.368, Ls.7-10.) The two girls got back
on the phone with the 911 operator to inform the police that Ellington was back
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on the road and that they were following Ellington a second time -- this time with
their parents following close behind. (Tr., p.368, L.19 - p.369, L.i7.)
Ellington was traveling at very high speeds driving back toward the
residence on Scarcello Road where he had been earlier.

(Tr., p.369, L.2i -

p.37i, L.i4.) Ellington drove past the residence around a curve and then turned
around. (Tr., p.37i, L.12 - p.372, L.2.) The girls stopped their Honda in front of
Ellington's Blazer; the girls' parents pulled up in front of the Honda in the Subaru.
(Tr., p.372, LsA-23.)

As the Subaru was coming to a stop, Ellington drove

around the driver's side of the Subaru, clipped it with the side of his vehicle, and
rammed the Honda with Joleen and Javon inside -- accelerating and driving the
Honda across the road approximately forty-five feet until the car's wheels
furrowed in the dirt. (Tr., p.767, L.i2 - p.772, L.25.) The girls' mother, Vonette
Larsen, got out of the vehicle and ran in the direction of the Honda.
Ls.23-25; p.774, L.25 - p.775, L.3.)

(Tr., p.773,

Joel Larsen also exited the vehicle and

removed a handgun that was in the vehicle. (Tr., p.773, L.25 - p.774, L.2.) Joel
also ran to where the Blazer had rammed the Honda. (Tr., p.773, L.25 - p.774,
L.2.)

Joel Larson never made it to the Honda.

Ellington, after pushing the

Honda all the way across the road, reversed the Blazer back on the road. (Tr.,
p.775, L.12 - p.776, L.21.) Ellington made a hard left and accelerated toward
Vonette Larsen who was still running to the Honda. (Tr., p.779, L.i8 - p.78D,
L.i7.) As the Blazer travelled toward Vonette Larsen, in an attempt to stop the
Blazer from hitting his wife, Joel Larsen shot the passenger side front panel of
the Blazer. (Tr., p.779, L.i8 - p.78D, L.17.) The shot had no effect on the path
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of the vehicle. Ellington hit Vonette Larsen with his Blazer causing her body to
come down on the hood of the Blazer and then to the ground where she was
ultimately run over and killed.

(Tr., p.781, Ls.11-12, p.781, L.21 - p.782, L.3;

p.1466, Ls.8-24.) The entire incident was recorded by the 911 operator who was
on the phone with Joleen Larsen. (Tr., Ex. 151.)
After Ellington ran over Vonette Larsen, he left the scene and retumed to
the Cunningham residence.

(Tr., p.1069, L.5 - p.1071, U6.) Ellington went

inside where he continued to drink and watched football on the television. (Tr.,
p.1070, LA - p.1071, L.1S.) Law enforcement eventually located his Blazer at
the residence and subsequently placed Ellington under arrest. (Tr., p.1079, L.17
- p.1084, L.25.)

Ellington was charged with second degree murder and two

counts of aggravated battery. (R., Vol. I, pp.127-29.)
At trial the state proffered testimony from three eye-witnesses: Joel
Larsen, Joleen Larsen, and Javon Larsen. (Tr., p.342·, L.3 - pAOO, L.24; p.741,
L.22 - p.793, U2; p.1189, L.16 - p.1216, L.17.) There was extensive testimony
from the investigating officers regarding the physical evidence at the scene of the
accident. (Tr., p.142, L.9 - p.341, U8; p.1075, L.21 - p.1154, L.3; p.1178, L.6p.1178, L.6 - p.1189, L.15.)

The state also provided testimony from audio

forensic analyst, Eric Hartmann, who enhanced sound quality on the 911
recording of the incident. (Tr., pA70, L2 - p.580, L.24.) The state also submitted
testimony from an accident reconstruction expert, Idaho State Police Inspector
Sean Daly (Tr., p.686, L.1 - p.989, LA) and a pathologist who described injuries
sustained by Vonette Larsen (Tr., p.1246, L.9 - p.1261, L.11).
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After the state rested, Ellington also provided fact and expert witnesses.
The expert testimony came from a forensic engineer, Dr. William Skelton (Tr.,
p.1377, L.20 - p.1642, L.B) and an audio analyst, Greg Stutchman (Tr., p.1577,
L.9 - p.1617, L.12).
Following instructions and closing argument the case was submitted to the
jury.

The jury convicted Ellington on all charges.

(R. Vol. II, pp.379-BO.)

Ellington timely appeals from the judgment. (R. Vol. II, pp.432-34.)
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ISSUES
Ellington states the issues on appeal as follows:
1.

Did the State engage in numerous acts of misconduct which, when
considered in context, render Mr. Ellington's trial so fundamentally
unfair that he is now entitled to a new trial?

2.

Did the district court err in admitting certain highly prejudicial
evidence?

3.

Is Mr. Ellington entitled to a new trial based on the fact that the
entire panel of prospective jurors in his case was tainted by three
prospective jurors who expressed their opinions that he was guilty?

4.

Did the accumulation of errors in this case deprive Mr. Ellington of
a fair trial?

(Appellant's Brief, p.5.)
The state rephrases those issues on appeal as:
1.

Has Ellington failed to show the prosecutor vouched for the credibility of
the state's witnesses in her closing argument or that the claimed vouching
had any prejudicial effect on his right to a fair trial?

2.

Has Ellington failed to show that the district court abused its discretion
allowing the expert testimony of two witnesses and by not striking a word
from one exhibit?

3.

Has Ellington failed to show that the district court abused its discretion
when it did not dismiss the entire jury venire because three jurors
admitted that they had pre-conceived views of Ellington's guilt?

4.

Has Ellington failed to show any error, let alone an accumulation of errors,
that deprived Ellington of a fair trial?
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ARGUMENT

I.
Ellington Has Failed To Carry His Burden Of Establishing Prosecutorial
Misconduct
A.

Introduction
Ellington claims his rights were "abridged through various instances of

prosecutorial misconduct in this case."

(Appellant's Brief, p.30.)

alleges the prosecutor committed misconduct in two ways:

Ellington

1) "when the

prosecutor elicited testimony from the lead police detective which allowed the
jury to draw a negative inference" regarding Ellington's guilt from his silence
(Appellant's Brief, p.31 (capitalization removed)) and 2) by making "appeals to
the emotions of the jurors" (Appellant's Brief, p.30). Ellington also alleges this
claimed misconduct and other actions by the prosecutor showed the "State's
strategy from the outset of trial ... to prevail through the use of prejudice."
(Appellant's Brief, pA7.)

Neither the law nor the record support Ellington's

misconduct claims. Contrary to his assertions, none of the instances of claimed
misconduct were improper and his claim of a "strategy" to prevail through the use
of prejudice is both legally irrelevant and factually without basis. Furthermore,
Ellington has failed to show his trial was rendered unfair and, therefore, he has
not provided a basis for overturning his conviction.

B.

Standard Of Review
Appellate courts conduct a two-tiered inquiry to review allegations of

prosecutorial

misconduct.

First,

courts determine whether the alleged

misconduct was improper. If the court concludes that the conduct was improper,
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the court must then consider whether such misconduct resulted in prejudice to
the defendant or was harmless error. State v. Romero-Garcia, 139 Idaho 199,
202,75 P.3d 1209, 1212 (Ct. App. 2003).

C.

Ellington Has Failed To Establish Prosecutorial Misconduct Or That Any
Possible Misconduct Interfered With His Right To A Fair Trial
"The right to due process does not guarantee a defendant an error-free

trial but a fair one." State v. Reynolds, 120 Idaho 445,451, 816 P.2d 1002, 1008
(Ct. App. 1991). Similarly, the function of appellate review is "not to discipline
the prosecutor for misconduct, but to ensure that any such misconduct did not
interfere with the defendant's right to a fair trial."

lit

If the jury would have

reached the same result had the prosecutor's error not occurred, the error is
deemed harmless.

lit

Ellington has failed to demonstrate misconduct by the prosecutor, much
less conduct that would constitute reversible error.

D.

Ellington Has Failed To Show That The State Used Evidence Of His PostMiranda Silence To Establish Guilt Such That He Was Denied A Fair Trial
A defendant's decision to exercise his right to remain silent after receiving

Miranda wamings cannot be used in the state's case-in-chief for the purpose of

inviting the jury to infer guilt.

Doyle v. Ohio, 462 U.S. 610 (1976); Fletcher v.

Weir, 455 U.S. 603 (1982); State v. Lopez, 141 Idaho 575,577,114 P.3d 133,
135 (Ct. App. 2005); State v. Tucker, 138 Idaho 296, 62 P.3d 644 (Ct. App.
2003).

Mere reference to silence is not a violation of this right; a defendant

claiming a due process violation must demonstrate that the state used the
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evidence to show an inference of guilt. Greer v. Miller, 483 U.S. 756, 764-65
(1987) ("The fact of Miller's post-arrest silence was not submitted to the jury as
evidence from which it was allowed to draw any permissible inference, and thus
no Doyle violation occurred in this case."); Ellen v. Brady, 475 F.3d 5, 10-11 (1st
Cir. 2007) (no constitutional error occurs if government not allowed to "use"
silence to imply guilt).
Following his arrest at the Cunningham residence Ellington was placed in
Officer March's patrol car.

(Tr., p.235, L.17 - p.236, L.5; p.1084, Ls.22-25.)

Sergeant Maskell arrived shortly thereafter to investigate and observed Ellington
in the patrol car.

(Tr., p.211, L.11 - p.212, L.5; p.235, Ls.17-23.)

At trial

Sergeant Maskell was asked about the investigation and about his interaction
with Ellington.

Ellington complains of the following exchange between the

prosecutor and Sergeant Maskell:
Q.

At the time you got there [at the Cunningham's residence]
and he [Ellington] was in the back of that patrol car, was he
under arrest?

A.

Yes.

Q.

And so you did not interview him?

A.

I attempted to.

(Tr., p.236, Ls.3-7.)
As a threshold matter, even if this exchange could be inferred as
commentary on Ellington's right to silence, it was a comment made by the
witness and not by the prosecutor.

The statement "I attempted to" was a

nonresponsive answer to a leading question that would have avoided any
possible inference related to whether Ellington had invoked his right to silence.
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Consequently, there was no possible misconduct by the prosecutor. Indeed, the
trial court made the following factual finding: "In this particular case I don't think
there is a sufficient showing to satisfy the court that it was the government's
manifest intention to do that which has occurred here in terms of any inference
that could be drawn." (Tr., p.245, Ls.9-12.)
Furthermore, even if the statement could be attributed to the prosecutor,
Ellington has not met has burden of showing that he invoked his right to remain
silent and that this is the reason why the interview was not conducted. At best,
the statement that the officer "attempted to" interview Ellington was only an
indirect reference to a possible invocation of the rig ht to silence with no inference
of guilt based on that reference.

Contrary to Ellington's claims, there was

nothing in the prosecutor's question or the officer's response that suggests that
the reason why the sergeant did not interview Ellington was because he invoked
his right to silence and that this invocation inferred guilt. The record does not
say whether Ellington was even informed of his right to remain silent, and if he
was so informed, when he was so

info~med.

As noted by the district court,

"[t]here is certainly no evidence in front of the court, in front of this jury that any
Miranda had been presented to Mr. Ellington for the jury's considerations." (Tr.,

p.246, Ls.2-4.) The trial court also noted that there was no explanation at all as
to why any attempt to interview Ellington "did not follow through, whether it was
because the detective didn't have time, take the time, somebody else didn't do it
or was supposed to do it, or what the reasons behind this supposed failed
attempt are." (Tr., p.246, Ls.6-9.) Consequently, in order to meet his burden the
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jury would, in the words of the trial court, have to make a "quantum leap." (Tr.,
p.246, Ls.10-14.) The district court's determinations are correct. The statement
made by law enforcement that he attempted to interview Ellington is insufficient
to meet Ellington's burden of showing that he had invoked his right to remain
silent and that this was the reason the interview was not conducted and that this
infers guilt.
Even if Ellington could establish error, he has failed to show reversible
error. Assuming, arguendo, that error exists, this case is similar in context to
State v. Martinez, 128 Idaho 104, 910 P.2d 776 (Ct. App. 1995). In Martinez,
this court addressed the same issue and concluded that a more egregious
reference to a criminal defendant's right to silence was harmless. In Martinez,
the detective testified that he "wanted to talk with [Martinez] about what had
happened from his perspective. However, he chose not to talk to me." Martinez,
128 Idaho at 111, 910 P.2d at 783.
The Court of Appeals held that the admission of this testimony was error.
However, the court also held that the error was harmless. Id. at 113, 910 P.2d at
785. The court highlighted the fact that 1) the testimony was not intentionally
elicited by the prosecutor, 2) the testimony was quite brief, and 3) the testimony
was not emphasized.

!s:L.

The court wrote, "[I]ndeed, upon mention by [the

detective] that Martinez 'did not wish to speak to' him, the prosecutor
immediately steered [the detective] away from this line of testimony." Id.
Similarly, here, the testimony was also 1) not intentionally elicited by the
prosecutor, 2) extremely brief, and 3) not highlighted or emphasized in any way.
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Indeed, as in Martinez, the prosecutor in this case avoided the issue and never
referenced the testimony during the case-in-chief or in closing. (Tr., pp.100-105;
110-113.) Thus, all of the mitigating factors found in Martinez, and even more
are present in this case. This one line of testimony challenged did not violate
Ellington's due process right to a fair trial.

E.

Ellington Has Failed To Show That The State Solicited Evidence That
Aroused The Passions And Prejudices Of The JUry And Denied Him His
RightTo A Fair Trial
Ellington also contends prosecutorial misconduct claiming that the

prosecutor sought to inflame the passions and prejudices of the jury.
(Appellant's Brief, pp.38-40.) Ellington identifies three instances of misconduct
on this basis and also claims that the prosecutor had a "strategy" of convicting
Ellington on the basis of prejudice.

First, Ellington claims misconduct on the

basis of testimony elicited from a witness regarding his short employment history
that ended with his work on this case. (Appellant's Brief, pp.36-40.) Second,
Ellington argues the prosecutor sought to inflame the passions and prejudices of
the jury because the prosecutor repeated the statement that Ellington "ran over"
Vonette Larsen. (Appellant's Brief, ppAO-42.) Third, Ellington claims that the
prosecutor improperly appealed to the passions and prejudices of the jury by
introducing testimony from an expert that was inconsistent with the prosecutor's
offer of proof. As set forth below, all three of these claims are without merit.
Additionally, Ellington's contention that the "State's strategy from the outset of
trial was to prevail though the use of prejudice" (Appellant's Brief, pA7) fails
because it is both utterly unsupported by the record and is legally irrelevant.
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Prosecutorial misconduct may occur when the prosecutor takes action
that is "'calculated to inflame the minds of jurors and arouse passion or prejudice
against the defendant, or is so inflammatory that the jurors may be influenced to
determine guilt on factors outside the evidence.''' State v. Porter, 130 Idaho 772,
785,948 P.2d 127, 140 (1997) (quoting State v. Babb, 125 Idaho 934, 942, 877
P.2d 905, 913 (1994)).

Prosecutorial misconduct reaches the level of a

constitutional violation only if the argument "so infect[s] the trial with unfairness
as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process." Donnelly v.
DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 642-45 (1974). Here, no such violation occurred.

1.

The Prosecutor Did Not Elicit Testimony Or Make Statements To
Arouse The Prejudices Of The JUry When He Questioned Mr.
Hartmann Regarding The Reasons Why He Worked At RMIN Only
For A Short Period Of Time

Ellington claims the prosecutor engaged in prosecutorial misconduct
during the direct examination of Eric Hartmann, the forensic audio analyst that
enhanced the sound quality on the 911 digital recording of the incident between
Ellington and the Larsen family.

(Appellant's Brief, pp.37-40.)

Specifically,

Ellington challenges the following portion of that direct examination as arousing
the passions and prejudices of the jury:
Q.

And at some point you worked on a 911 call that involves·
this matter?

A.

That is correct?

Q.

Can you tell us, please, why you only worked at RMIN for
two months?

A.

The simple answer is this case in particular left me with the
inability to sleep and I decided that--
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Q.

Objection, Your Honor, relevance, move to strike and
admonish the jury not to consider that.

(Tr., p.525, Ls.13-21.) Ellington claims there was "no proper purpose for [the
prosecutor] to have posed the question that he did" and that it was an "attempt to
once again influence the jury with an emotional appeaL"

(Appellant's Brief,

pAO.) Ellington's claim is without basis and misstates the law.
It was entirely relevant for the prosecutor to explain that Hartmann's short
time working as a forensic analyst -- that ended with his work on this case -- was
not because of poor performance or for a reason related to his ability to do his
job well. The fact Hartmann only worked as a forensic audio analyst for only two
months could have led to inferences that he was incompetent or otherwise
unable to do perform his job.

Consequently, the question, "Can you tell us,

please, why you only worked at RMIN for two months?" and the answer were
relevant.
Even

assuming

that

the

answer

was

excludable

under

the

probative/prejudicial balancing of Idaho Rule of Evidence 403, the statement was
not so inflammatory as to cause the jury to determine guilt on factors outside the
evidence. See Porter, 130 Idaho at 785, 948 P.2d at 140. The gruesome and
tragic nature of what happened was well documented and clearly before the jury
in various forms of evidence and testimony. The jury heard three eye-witness
accounts describing in detail the accident. (Tr., p.342, L.3 - pAOO, L.24; p.741,
L.22 - p.793, L.12; p.1189, L.16 - p.1216, L.17.) The jury viewed pictures of the
accident scene -- including Ms. Larsen's body after she had been run over and
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killed. (Tr., p.175, Ls.15-16; p.632, Ls.13-15; Tr., Ex. 10, 28, 38, 39, and 45.)
The jury also heard the audio recording of the incident including the collision
between Ellington and the Larsen girls and the traumatic nature of Vonette
Larsen's death (including the emotional reaction of the girls).

(Tr., Ex. 151.)

Hartmann's statement that the case was gruesome for him and that is why he
stopped doing forensic analysis added nothing to the what the jury obviously
knew -- that this case involved gruesome details and context.
Despite the gruesome nature of the death of Vonette Larsen, the case
turned on whether Ellington intended to batter the Larson girls with his Blazer
and intended to run over Mrs. Larsen. In light of the evidence before the jury,
Mr. Hartmann's statement did not deprive Ellington of his right to have the jury
decide his guilt based solely on the evidence.
2.

The Prosecutor Did Not Engage In Misconduct By Repeatedly
Referencing The Fact That Ellington Ran Over Mr. Larsen's Wife

Ellington claims the repeated use of the phrase "running over your wife" or
similar questioning statements during Mr. Larson's testimony constituted
prosecutorial misconduct. (Appellant's Brief, p.40.) Ellington is mistaken. The
fact that Ellington ran over Mr. Larsen's wife was an undisputed fact of this case.
Ellington's guilt turned not on whether he ran over Mrs. Larsen but whether his
acts were intentional.
A review of questioning of Joel Larsen by the prosecutor shows, the focus
of the repeated statements was not on the fact that Ellington ran over Mr.
Larsen's wife, but that he ran her over in the wrong lane -- indicating that he
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intentionally ran her over. "After he got done running over your wife, was he still
in the wrong lane of travel there?"

(Tr., p.783, Ls.13-14 (emphasis added).)

"How long after--he ran over your wife in the wrong lane of travel, is that right?"
(Tr., p.783, LS.17-18 (emphasis added).) "After he got done running over your
wife, when did he get back in the correct lane of travel to go eastbound on
Scarcello? How long after he got done running over her was it that he got back
into the correct lane?" (Tr., p.783, LS.20-23 (emphasis added).) The thrust of
this examination was on the fact that Ellington ran over Vonette Larsen while
traveling in the wrong lane of traffic, indicating that he intentionally ran her over -the controlling issue in the case. The prosecutor's use of the event of running
over Mrs. Larsen in questioning to provide context was proper.
Even if repeating the statements could be construed as misconduct they
were not statements that added anything to what the jury obviously knew or felt.
It was undisputed that Ellington ran over Vonette Larsen killing her and that this
happened in front of Joel Larsen and his two girls. Indeed, Joleen Larsen's real
time reaction was heard in the 911 call.

(Tr., Ex. 151.)

The fact that the

prosecutor repeated the statement "he ran over your wife" had no effect on the
jury's ability to determine guilt on the issue that needed to be decided -- whether
he intentionally ran over Vonette Larsen.

3.

The Prosecutor Did Not Engage In Misconduct By Offering The
Testimony Of The Pathologist

Ellington claims the prosecutor engaged in misconduct by successfully
proffering Dr. Marco Ross's testimony describing the injuries sustained by
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Vonette Larsen.

(Appellant's Brief, p.42.)

Ellington further claims that the

prosecutor was able to accomplish this by committing a "[f]raud" upon the court
by making an offer of proof that was inconsistent with the testimony ultimately
provided by Dr. Ross. (Appellant's Brief, p.42.) Ellington's claim lacks merit.
The testimony that Dr. Ross provided was relevant and admissible. Because Dr.
Ross's testimony was admissible, it cannot be the basis of a claim that Ellington
was deprived of his right to a fair trial. Further, a review of the record shows that
Dr. Ross's testimony was consistent with the prosecutor's offer of proof and that
there was no "fraud."
At trial, Ellington moved the court to exclude Dr. Ross's testimony on the
basis that it was "just testimony about her injuries" and, therefore, would be
cumulative and irrelevant. (Tr., p.1241, Ls.6-21; p.1243, Ls.12-22.) On appeal,
Ellington continues to argue that Dr. Ross's testimony was inadmissible.
(Appellant's Brief, p.44.)

Ellington fails to appreciate the significance of Dr.

Ross's testimony. Dr. Ross did not simply describe Vonette Larsen's injuries,
but described how those injuries were inflicted and provided information that
could be used by the jury to determine whether Ellington intentionally ran over
Vonette Larsen.

Dr. Ross testified that Vonette Larsen's injuries to her chest

were consistent with a "blunt force impact as opposed to a crushing type of
force." (Tr., p.1255, L.11 - p.1256, L.5.) Dr. Ross also testified that the injuries
on her body did not suggest that her body was dragged. (Tr., p.1255, Ls.7-10)
This testimony was significant to the question of how fast Ellington was traveling
in his Blazer at the time he hit Vonette Larsen which was material to the question
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of whether Ellington's actions were intentional.

In other words, his testimony

indicated that at least some of the victim's injuries were caused by the impact of
a vehicle moving at great speed not a vehicle hitting her at a slow speed then
dragging her and crushing her with its weight as it moved over her. Accordingly,
Dr. Ross's testimony was not cumulative but relevant to the issue of intent.
Because the Dr. Ross's testimony was admissible, the question of
whether the Dr. Ross's testimony matched the prosecutor's offer of proof, which
offer of proof was never provided to the jury, is legally irrelevant to the question
of unfairly prejudicing the jury.

Nevertheless, there was no fraud.

The

prosecutor's offer of proof was that Dr. Ross was going to distinguish Vonette
Larsen's injuries -- those injuries that she suffered from being struck as opposed
to those she suffered from being run over:
The Court:

You feel your physician is going to be able to
distinguish those two injuries? In other words, those
that were the result of being struck and those that
were the result of being run over.

Prosecutor: Yes.
The Court:

And that's the offer Your presenting?

Prosecutor: That's the main purpose. And I do feel that's what
the doctor is going to testify in regards to.
(Tr., p.1243, Ls.3-10.)
Consistent with that offer of proof, Dr. Ross testified that the injuries to
Vonette Larsen's abdomen and chest area were caused by "blunt force impact"
(Tr., p.1255, L.11 - p.1256, L.5) and that the injuries to her head were consistent
with being run over by a tire (Tr., p.1257, L.22 - p.1258, L.18).
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Accordingly, not only was Dr. Ross's testimony admissible, but it was
consistent with the offer of proof given by the prosecutor. Ellington's claims of
misconduct and his assertion that he is entitled to a new trial are entirely without
basis and were properly denied by the trial court.

F.

Ellington's Claims Of Misconduct Did Not Preclude Him From Receiving A
Fair Trial And, Therefore, Ellington Was Not Entitled To A New Trial
Ellington contends that the above cited claimed misconduct was indicative

of "a larger pattern of attempting to prejudice the jury" and that this, along with
the specific instances of claimed misconduct, establish prosecutorial misconduct
and entitled Ellington to a new trial.

(Appellant's Brief, p.47 (internal

capitalization removed).) This claim lacks merit. There was no basis for granting
Ellington a new trial based on any individual instances of claimed misconduct or
any other conduct identified by Ellington that he claims is was part of a strategy
to prejudice the jurors.
Motions for mistrial are governed by Idaho Criminal Rule 29.1. State v.
Barcella, 135 Idaho 191, 197,16 P.3d 288, 294 (Ct. App. 2000). A "mistrial may
be declared upon motion of the defendant, when there occurs during the trial an
error or legal defect in the proceedings, or conduct inside or outside the
courtroom, which is prejudicial to the defendant and deprives the defendant of a
fair trial." I.C.R. 29.1 (a).

Here, as set forth above, Ellington has not met his

burden of establishing any prosecutorial misconduct.

Furthermore, the

"examples of conduct" that Ellington claims demonstrate a strategy to prevail
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through the use of prejudice also fall woefully short of showing that Ellington was
deprived of a fair trial.
Ellington also argues that his claims of prosecutorial misconduct,
combined with other statements by the prosecutor, statements "not presented as
individual claims of misconduct," demonstrate that the "State's strategy from the
outset of trial was to prevail though the use of prejudice."

(Appellant's Brief,

pA7.) Ellington points to the fact that the prosecutor attempted to introduce a
large number of photographs and testimony regarding the extent of Vonette
Larsen's injuries. (Appellant's Brief, p.50-52.) Ellington's argument misses the
mark.
The United States Supreme Court has made clear that "the constitutional
obligation [of determining whether a defendant receives a fair trial]" is not
"measured by the moral culpability, or willfulness, of the prosecutor."

United

States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 110 (1976). In Agurs, the Court noted that it had
previously and "expressly rejected the good faith or the bad faith of the
prosecutor as the controlling consideration" in determining whether a defendant
received a fair trial.

kL.

at 110 n.17. The court recognized that purpose is "not

punishment of society for misdeeds of a prosecutor but avoidance of an unfair
trial to the accused."

kL.;

see also State v. Smith, 116 Idaho 553,557,777 P.2d

1226, 1230 (Ct. App.1989) ("This approach [as outlined in AgursJ is consistent
with a recent trend in criminal procedure away from focusing on subjective
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prosecutorial motives and toward an objective determination of whether a
defendant has received a fair trial.,,).1
Thus, here, regardless of whether Ellington can show a pattern of
attempts that indicate the prosecutor's intent, the controlling determination of
prosecutorial misconduct and entitlement to a new trial is whether the actual
misconduct deprived Ellington of a fair trial -- a burden Ellington has not met.
Even if the prosecutor's intent was relevant to this case, the conduct
Ellington identifies does not support his contention that a pattern of misconduct
existed.

In addition to the four instances of claimed misconduct addressed

above, Ellington claims the prosecutor exhibited other conduct that showed that
the state intended to convict Ellington on the basis of prejudice.

(Appellant's

Brief, p.47.) Ellington first claims the prosecutor's bad intent was shown at the
beginning of the trial when the prosecutor "responded to the district court's
request that he introduce himself' by "presenting the State's interpretation of the
evidence, as if it was established fact." (Appellant's Brief, p.48.) In support of
this claim, Ellington cites instances where the prosecutor was permitted to
present the State's interpretation of the evidence to prospective jurors and where
he "offered the State's interpretation of the evidence as if it was established fact"

1 The state concedes that the prosecutor's intent can be relevant to prosecutorial
misconduct. See, M.,., State v. Babb, 125 Idaho 934,942, 877 P.2d 905, 913
(1994). However, as alluded to by the United States Supreme Court, the motives
only become relevant if there is something that has happened that has had an
affect on the trial. At that point courts look to see if that prejudicial act was
intentional. However, to find a due process violation solely because of a bad
intent, without an indication that misconduct occurred and precluded the
defendant from receiving a fair trial, is placing the cart before the horse.
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and that this was "an attempt to predispose the jury to find Mr. Ellington guilty."
(Appellant's Brief, pA8.)
As an initial matter, the fact that a prosecutor presents "State's evidence"
as fact does not support the argument that prosecutor intended to convict a
criminal defendant on the basis of prejudice.

Rather, it shows that the

prosecutor was trying to convict on the basis of evidence not prejudice.
Regardless, Ellington has cited no authority or law that would preclude the
prosecutor from making the statements made he made -- reasonable
interpretations based on what was to be presented by the state in their case-inchief. See State v. Zichko, 129 Idaho 259, 263, 923 P.2d 966, 970 (1996) (court
will not consider arguments not supported by citation to law).
Ellington also takes issue with the fact that the prosecutor "fought to have
a large number of extremely graphic and disturbing photographs of Mrs. Larsen's
injuries admitted into evidence to be shown to the jury." (Appellant's Brief, p.50.)
Ellington concedes that "most of those photos were ruled inadmissible by the
district court" but claims that this attempt and continued attempts to admit
photographs of the victim were attempts to "try this case based on extraneous
considerations."

(Appellant's Brief, p.52.)

Because these photos were never

admitted and never submitted to the jury, it is impossible for these photos to
have precluded Ellington from receiving a fair trial. In addition, Ellington's claim
that a prosecutor commits misconduct merely by arguing that evidence should
not be excluded under I.RE 403 is without legal basis.
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Finally, Ellington claims that the prosecutor "elicited opinion testimony
from [Idaho State Police Investigator] Daly to the effect that the collisions at
issue in this case were intentional, not accidental" and that this supported his
claim that the "state [was] attempting to try this case based on extraneous
considerations." (Appellant's Brief, p.52.) Evidence that Ellington ran over and
intentionally killed Vonette Larsen was not an extraneous consideration.

Moreover, there was nothing in the Idaho Rules of Evidence that precluded
Investigator Daly from testifying, based on his experience as an investigator, that
Ellington pushing the white Honda across the road and into the dirt in his Blazer - approximately 45 feet -- was not accidental.
In sum, there is no basis for Ellington's motion for mistrial or claims of
prosecutorial misconduct because there was no action that deprived him of
receiving a fair trial.

Further, the conduct that he contends is support for his

claimed pattern of misconduct, does not support his argument.

II.
The District Court Properly Exercised Its Discretion In Admitting Evidence

A.

Introd uction
Ellington's second argument on appeal is that the district court erred by

admitting an exhibit with the word homicide and by allowing two of the state's
experts, an accident reconstruction expert, Investigator Daly, and pathologist, Dr.
Marco Ross, to testify.

Ellington's claims have no merit.

The testimony of

Investigator Daly was consistent with the Idaho Rules of Evidence and the
testimony of Dr. Ross was relevant and not substantially outweighed by
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prejudice. With regard to the exhibit, as conceded by defense counsel, the word
"homicide" accurately described the accident scene; therefore, it was within the
discretion of the district court to not strike the word "homicide" from the exhibit
after it had been admitted without objection.

B.

Standard Of Review
The trial court has broad discretion in the admission of evidence, and its

judgment will be reversed only when there has been an abuse of that discretion.
State v. Howard, 135 Idaho 727, 731-32, 24 P.3d 44, 48-49 (2001); State v.
Zimmerman, 121 Idaho 971, 974, 829 P.2d 861 (1992).

The admissibility of

expert testimony is discretionary and will not be disturbed on appeal absent a
showing of an abuse of discretion. State v. Crea, 119 Idaho 352, 806 P.2d 445
(1991); State v. Parkinson, 128 Idaho 29,909 P.2d 647 (Ct. App. 1996).

C.

The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion By Admitting An Exhibit
That Contained The Word Homicide
Ellington claims the district court abused its discretion by failing to strike

the word "homicide" off a large diagram that had been admitted and used by
Trooper Robnett to layout the scene of the accident. (Apppellant's Brief, p.56.)
As conceded by the defense counsel, the word was in "small print" along the top
of the diagram and not readily apparent to jury members. (Tr., p.628, Ls.3-10.)
Ellington claimed that "homicide" would be the same as "murder" in the jurors'
minds and, therefore, that it should stricken from the exhibit. (Tr., p.628, LS.2024.) The district court denied the motion making the following determinations:
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It seems to be really undisputed that Mrs. Larsen's demise was a
result of a traffic accident which involved vehicles being operated
by people, and there are a number of people involved and her
death was as a consequence of that. Certainly was not suicide,
there's nothing here to indicate Vonette Larsen's murder scene,
crime scene even.
(Tr., p.628, L.25 - p.629, L.5.) The district court concluded the word "homicide"
was an accurate description and did not need to be removed from the already
admitted exhibit. (Tr., p.628, L.25 - p.629, L.17.) Ellington makes no attempt to
show how the court's determinations were clearly erroneous. Indeed, Ellington
admits "the district court got the technical definition of 'homicide' right."
(Appellant's Brief, p.57.)

Accordingly, Ellington has failed to show how the

district court abused its broad discretion in the admission of evidence.

D.

The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion By Allowing Trooper Daly
To Testify That Ellington's Ramming Of The Honda Was Not Accidental
Ellington claims the district court abused its discretion by allowing an

accident reconstruction expert, Investigator Daly, to testify that Ellington
intentionally pushed the Honda with his Blazer across the road. Ellington claims
that Investigator "Daly's opinion was not a valid expert opinion and it should
never have been admitted under Rule 702." (Appellant's Brief, p.62.) Ellington
makes two arguments, both without basis.

First, Ellington claims that the

Investigator Daly was allowed to usurp the function of the jury by allowing the
expert to testify on one of the ultimate issues in the case.
pp.59-60.)

(Appellant's Brief,

Second, Ellington claims that the expert's testimony should have

been excluded because there "were other highly plausible inferences that could
be drawn" to show that Ellington unintentionally hit the white Honda and drove it
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forty-five feet across the road.

(Appellant's Brief, p. 61.) Both arguments are

without support.
Per Idaho Rule of Evidence 702, expert testimony is admissible when the
expert's specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the
evidence and determine a fact in question. See State v. Walters, 120 Idaho 46,
55, 813 P.2d 857, 866 (1991); State v. Hopkins, 113 Idaho 679, 680-81, 747
P.2d 88, 89-90 (Ct. App.1987).

Rule 704 allows testimony in the form of an

opinion even if it "embraces an ultimate issue to be decided by the trier of fact."
See State v. Crawford, 110 Idaho 577, 581, 716 P.2d 1349, 1353 (Ct. App.
1986); State v. Dragoman, 130 Idaho 537, 542, 944 P.2d 134, 139 (Ct. App.
1997) superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in State v. Ransom, 137
Idaho 560, 50 P.3d 1055 (Ct. App. 2002). Consequently, here, it was entirely
within the discretion of the court and consistent with the rules of evidence for
Investigator Daly, a qualified expert with specialized knowledge, to give his
opinion based on his observations of the accident scene regarding a controlling
issue in this case -- whether Ellington intentionally drove into the Honda.
Similarly, Investigator Daly is not precluded from giving his opinion simply
because there are other "plausible inferences" that could be drawn from the facts
of the case 2

Here, consistent with Rule 703, there was no question regarding

Investigator Daly's training or qualifications as an accident reconstruction expert.

2 There is no authority or support for this arg ument and, therefore, it is an
argument that should not be considered. See Zichko, 129 Idaho 259, 263, 923
P.2d 966, 970 (1996) (court will not consider arguments not supported by citation
to law).
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(Tr., p.686, L. - p.691, L.6.) There was also no question as to how Investigator
Daly reconstructed accidents (Tr., p.692, L.2 - p. 694, L.i2) or that he used this
experience and training to reconstruct the present accident based on evidence
that was gathered in this case (Tr., p.694, L.2i - p.736, L.10; p.864, L.ii - p.9i9,
L.i6). Consequently, the district court did not abuse its discretion by allowing
Investigator Daly give his expert opinion.

E.

The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion By Allowing Dr. Marco
Ross To Testify About The Type Of Injuries Sustained By Vonette Larson
Ellington also claims the district court abused its discretion by allowing Dr.

Marco Ross, a pathologist, testify. (Appellant's Brief, p.62.) Ellington claims Dr.
Ross's testimony was irrelevant and that the probative value of Dr. Ross's
testimony was substantially outweighed by prejudice.
63.) Ellington's claim is without merit.

(Appellant's Brief, p.62-

Dr. Ross's testimony was admitted to

show that there were injuries to both Vonette Larsen's head and abdomen and
that those injuries were consistent with first being hit by a fast moving object,
~,

a fast moving Blazer, as opposed to being hit by a slow moving Blazer.

Consistent with the prosecutor's offer of proof, Dr. Ross described the injuries to
Vonette Larsen's abdomen and chest area (Tr., p.i25i, Ls.3-i0) and the injuries
to her head (Tr., p.i252, L.13 - p.i255, L.6).

Based on his observations and

expertise, Dr. Ross concluded that the injuries were consistent with being hit by a
blunt fast-moving object as opposed to being drug.

(Tr., p.i255, Ls.ii-i5.)

Whether Ellington was driving the Blazer fast, possibly accelerating, was a
relevant factor in determining whether Ellington intended to kill Vonette Larsen.
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Moreover, because Ellington's intent was the primary issue in the case, the value
of Dr. Ross's testimony was particularly probative and was not substantially
outweighed by the prejudice of exposing the jury to additional detail of Vonette
Larsen's gruesome injuries.

III.
Ellington Has Failed To Demonstrate That His Due Process Rights Were
Violated By The Voir Dire Process Of Excusing Jurors
A.

Introd uction
Ellington's argues that "his right to an unbiased jury was violated when

three prospective jurors tainted the entire panel of prospective jurors by
expressing their pre-conceived views" that Ellington was guilty of the charged
offenses. (Appellant's Brief, pp.68-69.) Ellington's claim fails because he has
not shown on the record that any of the actual jurors that sat on his case were
biased or that district court abused its discretion when it determined that the
statements did not preclude Ellington from receiving an unbiased jury.

B.

Standard Of Review
"The determination of whether a juror can render a fair and impartial

verdict rests in the sound discretion of the trial court." State v. Luke, 134 Idaho
294, 298, 1 P.3d 795, 799 (2000); State v. Hedger, 115 Idaho 598, 600, 769
P.2d 1331, 1333 (1989).

Similarly, a trial judge is given broad discretion in

supervision of the jury selection process to ensure that a panel of competent
jurors is selected. State v. Merrifield, 109 Idaho 11, 16,704 P.2d 343, 349 (Ct.
App. 1985).
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C.

Ellington Has Failed To Show That The District Court Abused Its
Discretion In Determining That Ellington Failed To Show That He Could
Not Select A Fair And Impartial JUry From The JUry Panel
Any claim that the jury was impartial must focus on the jurors who actually

sat on the case. State v. Santana, 135 Idaho 58, 63, 14 P.3d 378, 383 (2000)
(citing Ross v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 81 (1988)). A due process challenge "must
fail" where a defendant "does not allege or cannot demonstrate that a member of
his or her jury was biased or prejudiced." Santana, 135 Idaho at 63, 14 P.3d at
383.
Ellington broadly asserts that all the jurors were tainted by three
prospective jurors that expressed their pre-conceived determinations that
Ellington was guilty. (Appellant's Brief, p. 68-70.) Despite his broad assertions,
Ellington has submitted no evidence that any of the jurors that sat on his case
were biased because three prospective jurors expressed their preconceptions as
part of the jury selection. Indeed, Ellington concedes that "no actual bias can be
shown." (Appellant's Brief, p.76.) Further, the trial court explicitly found that the
jurors were not "tainted" by comments made by the prospective jurors. (Supp.
Tr., p.61, Ls.5-25.)

Consequently, Ellington has not met his burden of

establishing a due process violation, see State v. Scroggins, 91 Idaho 847, 433
P.2d 117 (1967) (exposure of the jury to an article reporting that Scroggins also
faced other, separate charges did not violate Scroggins' due process rights), or
that the district court abused its discretion when it determined that the remaining
jury pool was not biased and that Ellington could receive a fair trial.
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IV.
Ellington Has Failed To Establish Any Error Or An Accumulation Of Errors That
Deprived Him Of A Fair Trial

"Cumulative error" refers to a number of errors which prejudice a
defendant's right to a fair trial.

Under the cumulative error doctrine, an

accumulation of irregularities, each of which in itself might be harmless, may in
the aggregate deprive a defendant of a fair trial. State v. Missamore, 119 Idaho
27, 803 P.2d 528, 533 (1990). Cumulative error may only be found when the
court determines that there is merit to more than one alleged error and that the
errors, when aggregated, denied the defendant a fair trial. State v. Barcella, 135
Idaho 191, 204,16 P.3d 288, 301 (Ct. App. 2000).
Ellington asserts on appeal that cumulative effect of the errors alleged
above deprived him of a fair trial.

(Appellant's Brief, p.76.)

Ellington's

contention is without merit, however. Ellington has failed to show that two or
more errors occurred in his trial, and, therefore, the doctrine is inapplicable to
this case. See State v. Hawkins, 131 Idaho 396, 958 P.2d 22 (Ct. App. 1998)
(reaffirming the principle that a necessary predicate to application of the doctrine
is a finding of more than one error).
Even if Ellington could establish more than one error, he has failed to
show that he did not receive a fair trial.
that Ellington received a fair trial.

In this case there can be no question

When viewed in the full context of the trial

record, it cannot reasonably be said that the cumulative effect of the errors
alleged by Ellington contributed to his conviction or otherwise affected his
substantial rights.

Based on the arguments set forth
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above and the

overwhelming evidence of guilt presented at trial, the state submits that any error
that did exist was harmless and did not singularly or in combination result in a
denial of due process such as would require reversal. State v. Gray, 129 Idaho
784, 804, 932 P.2d 907, 927 (Ct. App. 1997).

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests Ellington's convictions be affirmed.
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